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Several times in this valiant biography,' G. Edward White considers
and rejects luck as an explanation for the superlative career of his less
than superlatively gifted subject. Professor White does acknowledge that
the first important step in Earl Warren's march to the Supreme Court-a
march that looks in retrospect like a parlay of lucky turns extended over
thirty-five years-was a "fortuitous congruity of Warren's ambition to do
trial litigation and the availability of a position in the district attorney's
office of Alameda County."2 He also admits seeing in the middle years,
when Warren was District Attorney, Attorney General, and Governor, a
"convergence. . . of [Warren's] special character traits [with] the political
climate of California."' And he reports in detail the burst of interacting
coincidences in 1952 and 1953 that pushed Warren toward his nomina-
tion as Chief Justice.4
t Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
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4. Chief Justice Vinson died of a heart attack in September 1953, only five days after Warren had
announced his intention to retire as Governor of California; Warren had come to his decision to retire
partly because President Eisenhower had offered him the post of Solicitor General with a promise
that he would be named to fill the first vacancy on the Supreme Court, the President, who did not
regard his commitment to Warren as extending to the Chief Justiceship, had first sounded out John
Foster Dulles for that position, but Dulles preferred to stay on as Secretary of State; when the Presi-
dent and his advisors finally turned to Warren, they still had vivid memories of Warren's support at
the Republican National Convention and in the election of 1952, and, far off the mark, they sized him
up as a middle-of-the-road Republican, sympathetic by temperament and conviction to the Eisen-
hower Administration's policies and programs. Pp. 145-53. White also volunteers that Warren him-
self later quoted Eisenhower as calling the appointment of Warren to the Court the "biggest damn
fool thing I ever did." Pp. 129-30 (quoting E. WARREN, THE MEMOmS OF CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN
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Nevertheless, White insists that what allowed Warren to "raise[] ethics
to a high judicial art"5 and thus become a "major figure[] in twentieth-
century American history" 6 was not luck but the unfolding of his own
qualities:
[Among Warren's] most memorable qualities were . . . presence,
timing, capacity for growth, persuasiveness, inner conviction, de-
cency, persistence, reasonability . . . . [These allowed him to be-
come] a symbol for a large inarticulate body of the American public
[and to] pursue[] Everyman's instinctive ideal of fairness. . . . [H]e
was . . . a great man . . . . In a public world of corruptible and
self-serving actors, he set a standard of incorruptibility and human-
ity; in a society fraught with injustices, he sought to use the power of
his offices to promote decency and justice.7
Some readers will be slow to agree that by and large Warren's pre-
Supreme Court career shows virtue inexorably transcending luck. They
may give both greater weight than White does to the element of luck and
less to the element of virtue. For these doubters, White provides a full and
fair aide-mgmoire-full in the range of episodes it reports and fair in the
comments it makes about them.
For example, White recounts in detail the Point Lobos murder case,
which in 1936 and 1937 made District Attorney Warren a public figure
in California and first brought him national attention. Here White re-
minds his audience of "what has become the most established interpreta-
tion of Warren's actions":8 that "the investigators from Warren's office
engaged in 'gross fourth amendment violations"'; that "'confessions were
[allegedly] coerced both physically and psychologically"'; and that
"'[many people. . . thought the defendants . . . were innocent, despite
the verdict.""
White scrupulously discloses several other episodes hard to reconcile
with his holding up Warren's public life as a lesson on virtue triumphant.
Of these, the episode most out of line with White's thesis is the program,
begun a few days after Pearl Harbor, of relocating Japanese Americans
from the California coast (and the Oregon and Washington coasts as well)
to inland detention centers. Again White tells the reader all he needs to
know, from Warren's membership in the Native Sons of the Golden West,
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ernors in 1943 that "no one [is] able to tell a saboteur from any other
Jap."'10 And in commenting on what such facts say of Warren's ethos as a
civil servant, White does not hold back unfavorable judgments. Here, on
the contrary, is his summary of Warren's role in the Japanese evacuation
and internment: "Warren not only participated in but can be said to have
engineered one of the most conspicuously racist and repressive governmen-
tal acts in American history."11
Yet I believe that, in the end, most of White's audience, including those
who start off as doubters, will embrace his position that it was not luck
but a high mind, a stout heart, and a good character that shaped Warren's
career in California and made him a natural for eventual nomination to
the Supreme Court. If White adds to his burden of persuasion each time
he discloses adverse facts or pronounces an uncomplimentary judgment on
Warren, he also improves his own credibility with those he must per-
suade. Readers will decide early, with good reason, that they can trust
him. And so, when he follows unfavorable disclosures of Warren's actions
with explanations, mitigations, and comparisons with the more reprehen-
sible behavior of Warren's peers, readers are likely to find these defenses
trustworthy as well.
Consider, as an illustration of this method, some further details of
White's treatment of the least ingratiating episode in Warren's public life.
"[A]mong Warren's motives for excluding the Japanese from California,"
he writes-obviously making no effort to favor his subject or his thesis by
choosing gentle words-"was a provincial, xenophobic racism."1 2 He ad-
mits that Warren perceived all Japanese-Americans as "treacherous"1 " to
the nation in general, and in particular to the California that Warren
regarded as a "nativist paradise"1 4 to be preserved from foreign ideologies
in time of peace 5 and from sabotage in time of war.'"
All that and more said, White goes on to put Warren's connection with
the exclusion of Japanese-Americans into perspective.17 He reminds us
that California was in shock after Pearl Harbor-blacked out by night,
patrolled by civilian watchers by day, and assailed night and day by ru-
mors of spies and saboteurs. Despite censorship, word had gotten out that
Japanese submarines had surfaced within signalling distance of fishing
boats manned by Californians of Japanese descent, and that a Japanese








Vol. 93: 384, 1983
Earl Warren
submarine had sunk a tanker off San Luis Obispo. Many officials, War-
ren among them, knew that the Navy had deployed only two destroyers to
defend the Pacific coast from Canada to Mexico. When President
Roosevelt by executive order authorized the evacuation and internment of
Japanese-Americans, Congress overwhelmingly approved, as did nearly
all of the nation's best known journalists. In California, not one political
leader uttered a word of opposition.
Against that background of fear, not all of it to be dismissed as delu-
sional, Attorney General Warren stands out, in White's presentation, as
"the most visible and effective California public official advocating intern-
ment and evacuation of the American Japanese."18 But he does not stand
out as one upon whom it is fair to heap a heavy measure of individual
moral blame. On the contrary, White sees to it that readers understand
that Warren's connection with the program was as advocate, not inventor,
and that in his advocacy Warren simply voiced the sentiments of the peo-
ple of his state. Also, albeit by blurring distinctions between ethical merit
and constitutionality, White puts Warren in good company: "The United
States Supreme Court twice sustained constitutional challenges to the relo-
cation program. Among those who defended the program and its constitu-
tionality were Walter Lippmann, Harlan Fiske Stone, Felix Frankfurter,
William 0. Douglas, and Hugo Black." 9
White also extends his lines of moral perspective to the background of
Warren's youth. And again White reminds readers of the unfairness of
holding Warren personally responsible for prejudices that were folkways
of his early milieu. In Bakersfield, where Warren grew up, and at Berke-
ley, where he attended college and law school, an undifferentiating anti-
orientalism had long been established as a premise of social life; and, in
White's words, "no influential segment of California political life was
sympathetic to the Japanese. "20
When Warren entered politics in 1920, the "provincial, xenophobic ra-
cism" noted by White" was as endemic as slavery had been in the South
a hundred years before. That it did not occur to Warren to fight it then or
later in his political career ought not be counted against him any more
than, say, John Tyler's stance on slavery when he was running for the
Virginia House of Delegates in 1822.
White does more than scale down Warren's personal responsibility by
drawing it in the perspective of Pearl Harbor and the "yellow peril" hal-
lucination that had pervaded California for half a century. He shows
18. P. 71.
19. P. 75 (footnotes omitted).
20. P. 68.
21. P. 75.
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Warren conspicuously taking a stand for fairness toward the Japanese on
several occasions during World War II, when being noncommittal would
have been both easy and politically advantageous. He points out, for ex-
ample, that in February 1942, only a few days before President
Roosevelt's executive order on relocation was to come into effect, Attorney
General Warren opposed the State Agricultural Department's revocation
of licenses held by non-citizen Japanese to handle fruits and vegetables.22
He also reports that in December 1944, Governor Warren called upon
Californians to "join in protecting [the] constitutional rights" of the in-
terned Japanese, then about to be released.23 Finally, White notes that
when the first wave of revulsion toward the internment began to spread in
California and loud disavowals of the whole program became a much-
used politicians' ploy, Warren, who no doubt could have gotten away with
it, refused to allow his public relations minions to put him in a better light
than the facts warranted.24
If all that on the Japanese relocation is more than readers want to
know, this material, along with about as much again on other episodes
that have cast shadows on Warren's reputation, is nevertheless White's
best service to Warren. For Warren emerges from White's examination of
his political career as a man worthy of the moral judgment White pro-
nounces at the end: "In a public world of corruptible and self-serving
actors, he set a standard of incorruptibility and humanity; in a society
fraught with injustices, he sought to use the power of his offices to pro-
mote decency and justice.' 5
White's way with the rest of the book, an appreciation of Warren as
Chief Justice, is broadly similar to his treatment of Warren's earlier pub-
lic service. Again, only after making sure that readers know the worst that
has been said of Warren does he start on his affirmative case. And again,
here as there, he relies more on a show of overbalancing merits than on a
denial of faults.
For two fundamental reasons, however, this part of White's job is
harder: responsible criticism of Warren as Chief Justice is more solid and
extensive than criticism of Warren as a California functionary, and War-
ren's successes in Washington are more debatable than his successes in
Sacramento. Although White again acknowledges honestly and champions
loyally, this time, for all of White's valor, Warren does not come out so
well.
22. P. 74.
23. Id. (quoting Los Angeles Times, Dec. 19, 1944).
24. Id.
25. P. 369.
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A sense of what White had to contend with and how he did it can be
drawn from his treatment of Anthony Lewis's essay on Warren as Chief
Justice.2 ' Lewis's conclusions, liberally quoted by White, are that Warren
"made no attempt . . . to propound a consistent theory of how a judge
interpreting the Constitution should approach his task," and that his
opinions were "bland. . .presentation[s]. . almost. . . unencumbered
by precedents or conflicting theories," and short on "qualities valued in
the judicial process [such as] stability, intellectuality, [and]
craftsmanship.
'2 7
White responds to all that by explicitly conceding that Lewis's criti-
cisms are "not inaccurate. ' 28 Moreover, he volunteers a few comments of
his own that are just as condemnatory. He acknowledges that Warren's
"reasoning was often technically imperfect, opaque, or assertive," 29 that
Warren was "primarily interested in results,"30 and that he produced
opinions which, "divorce[d] ...from their ethical premises, . . . evapo-
rate." ' And, in a variety of formulations, he admits that Warren took his
own ethical judgment as a surer guide to decision than the explicit text of
the Constitution. 2
It is not upon a general or specific denial then, but upon a plea in
avoidance, that White relies to save Warren's good name as a jurist. To
vitiate a confession as damaging as the one we have seen, he needs an
avoidance of heroic sweep, and he produces one. First he calls into ques-
tion the judicial postulates of this century's dominant school of theorists on
constitutional adjudication. And then he claims for Warren's judicial per-
formance a merit independent of those postulates, a merit that makes itself
clear on its own without help from the classical juridical discourse in
which he has conceded Warren to be deficient.
White begins his examination of the orthodox view by defining it in
aphorisms that few would dispute. Although the Constitution and statutes
come to the Court already made, the Justices nonetheless inevitably make
constitutional and statutory law by transforming lifeless texts into working
rules that govern actual cases. Once the Court has taken this last step in
the enacting of law-which extends to the unmaking of law for noncon-
formity with the Constitution-no other agency of government has an op-
portunity to correct its errors or otherwise change its conclusions. There-
26. Lewis, Earl Warren, in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-
1969, at 2721 (1969).
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fore, if the Justices are not to betray both the principle of separation of
powers and their oath to decide cases "agreeably to the Constitution and
laws of the United States,"3 they must constantly and pervasively assume
an attitude of self-restraint.
Paraphrasing Holmes's dissent in Lochner v. New York,-" White spells
out what he takes judicial self-restraint to mean: that "Constitutional in-
terpretation . . . [is] not a process in which judges articulate[] their social
and economic theories"; 5 and that the judiciary can substitute its judg-
ments for those of the legislature only when the latter's acts were not
"rational."3 6 In sum, the judiciary's "proper role [is] . . . to defer to the
appropriate lawmaking branch of government.1
3 7
White makes it clear that Warren did not agree with the role accorded
to judges in the Holmesian scheme:
Warren did not share [all of] . . . the orthodox twentieth-century
theory of judicial review. Warren's Progressivism had led him to be-
lieve that legislatures were neither "democratic" nor "representa-
tive" . . . . He remained . . . a thoroughgoing skeptic about the
representativeness or democratic character of the legislative forum.
Warren had . . . been inclined, [in] California . . . to prefer his
own solutions to social problems over those of legislators ....
Warren became a champion of activism after the decision in
Brown . . . . [By the time of] Cooper v. Aaron, four years later, he
had . . . learned that deference to "democratic" branches of govern-
ment might perpetuate injustices. He had resumed the familiar
stance of Progressive champion of the public interest.3 8
White also makes it clear that he does not deplore such an an-
tidemocratic credo in the Chief Justice of the United States nor even the
risk of antidemocratic decisions it creates:
As a matter of history, and as a theoretical posture, there was noth-
ing indefensible about Warren's stance. He was returning to a scru-
tinizing role for the courts that was of longer standing in American
life than the role that Holmes helped to originate. . . . His activism
was based on the premise that justice needed to be done and that one
could not expect . . . that ostensibly more "democratic" institutions
would do it. 9
33. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1976).
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The two reasons that White suggests for rejecting Holmes's view do not
satisfy. The first-that the more "scrutinizing role" White prefers for the
courts is "of longer standing in American life"-is surely not enough, true
as it may be as a historical observation. If greater age ever gives greater
validity to one of two competing doctrines, it cannot do so here. The doc-
trine White prefers flourished in an age when statutes were few, when
there was no written constitution, and when the courts belonged to a sov-
ereign who professed to derive his political power from God. The eight
decades in which the doctrine White opposes has come into its own are a
period in which any year's output of federal statutes is many times the
volume of Blackstone's Commentaries, in which constitutional litigation is
commonplace, and in which we have come to understand that the pream-
ble of the Constitution in which We the People assert ourselves as the
source of political power is the essential statement of the American
Revolution.
White's second reason-that an activist judiciary is necessary to com-
pensate for the injustice inevitably engendered by democratic institu-
tions-is no better. There is nothing in the nature of things to suggest that
institutions politically responsive to the people through their representa-
tives should "perpetuate injustice" any more than a judiciary that feels
free to define natural law and justice on its own. But even if there were,
decent respect for the separation of powers prescribed in the Constitution
would seem to call for the judicial self-restraint central to the reigning
orthodoxy of this century. In any event, White cannot hope to carry the
day on the pleadings. If Holmes's theory, appealing as it is to believers in
democracy, is to be supplanted by Warren's, it will take a reasoned dem-
onstration. All White offers is sheer assertion.
Another analytical deficiency in this predominantly well-reasoned
book shows itself in the course of White's disquisition against the
Holmesian view. He accuses Felix Frankfurter, Holmes's best known dis-
ciple and "the arch defender of self-restraint," 40 of following a course that
Warren believed "regularly prevented justice from being done.' 41 But de-
spite devoting much of the book to the Warren-Frankfurter relation-
ship-an entire chapter entitled "Reacting to Felix Frankfurter," more
references to Frankfurter as Justice than to any other Justice, copious
notes on Frankfurter's non-judicial writings, and more-White, for all his
high competence as legal historian, searcher of archives, and analyst of
Supreme Court opinions, dredges up nothing that corroborates his charge.
What he does adduce-a recital of temperamental clashes between the
40. P. 177.
41. P. 187.
The Yale Law Journal
two and a catalogue of their doctrinal differences-is not only irrelevant to
the justice or lack of it in Frankfurter's juridical positions, but betrays a
fall by White from his usual high standard of objectivity.
On Warren's and Frankfurter's personal rift, he seems to forget that it
takes two to stage a temperamental clash and that it takes more than sheer
assertion by a biographer to establish that his subject was always on the
side of the angels. On their disagreement as jurists, White is no less asser-
tive, apparently expecting his summarily declared conclusions, which in-
variably put Frankfurter in the wrong, to be taken as gospel.
One need not be a partisan of Frankfurter-as, I admit, I am-to be
puzzled by White's elaborate aberration from the evenhandedness he
maintains toward other adversaries or critics of Warren. My hunch is that
the explanation lies in the influence of H.N. Hirsch's much-noticed recent
biography of Frankfurter.4 White not only cites Hirsch's work repeat-
edly, but at several crucial points in the main text reveals an undis-
criminating acceptance of everything bad about Frankfurter that Hirsch
has to say. Having spelled out my reasons elsewhere for believing that
Hirsch's picture of Frankfurter is an ill-tempered, ill-founded, and irre-
sponsible caricature,43 1 limit myself here to stating my chagrin that it has
had a debasing effect on White's high-minded effort.
White does not rest his case for Warren as jurist only upon such nega-
tives as his attacks on Holmes's judicial philosophy and Frankfurter's ju-
dicial behavior. He also presents Warren as a vindicator of ethical imper-
atives "emanating from the ethical structure of the Constitution," 44 which
are therefore more conducive to "good outcomes" 45 than "the principle of
fidelity to the constitutional text, the principle of deference to the legisla-
ture in close cases, the principle of adherence to precedent, the principle of
supplying reasoned professional justifications for results,'"'" or "doctrinal
consistency.
'47
After reading that Warren's ideas about the Constitution's ethical im-
peratives derived in part from "his own code of ethics,""18 one still won-
ders how he ascertained what those imperatives are. White does not say,
and one cannot deduce them from Warren's best known opinions. In Mi-
randa v. Arizona,49 for example, the four dissenting Justices were uncon-
vinced by Warren's discovery in the words of the Fifth or Fourteenth
42. H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981).
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Amendment of a requirement "that an individual held for interrogation
• . . be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer
and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation" and'that "this
warning [be] an absolute prerequisite to interrogation." 5 Skeptics surely
will remain unmoved by Warren's or White's belief that there is a non-
textual ethical imperative elsewhere in the Constitution demanding the
majority's conclusion. Even of Brown v. Board of Education51 one may
doubt that Warren could have rallied a unanimous Court to his opinion
by invoking some unwritten corollary of the Constitution instead of rely-
ing, as he actually did, on a straightforward reading of the words of the
Equal Protection Clause coupled with a factual determination that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."5
But I do not write off White's discussion of Warren, Chief Justice, as a
price readers pay for access to his magisterial treatment of Warren's pre-
Court career. What redeems it is this: If White too frequently takes War-
ren's judicial inadequacies as virtues and his antidemocratic self-
indulgences as judicious responses to moral commandments of the Consti-
tution, he never fails to lay out all the facts we need to judge for ourselves
whether inadequacy, virtue, self-indulgence, or judiciousness is the right
word for the particular behavior of Warren's that he is examining. And
so, no matter how many of White's laudatory conclusions we reject, we
must in fairness acknowledge the value and importance of the latter part
of the book. Thanks to White's honesty, skill, and diligence, it is a reliable
collection of materials providing an opportunity to appraise Warren's ju-
dicial performance as a whole, an opportunity that non-specialists rarely
have for any member of the Court.
If White, though trying to do better by Warren, exposes him as a sup-
porter of his own predilections rather than high juridical principle, White
may, paradoxically, have improved Warren's rating with many of White's
readers. For it may be that Charles Evans Hughes, one of Warren's most
admired predecessors as Chief Justice, was right when he said, as Justice
Douglas reports it, that "[a]t the constitutional level. . . ninety percent of
any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for
supporting our predilections."5" And whether or not Hughes was right, a
goodly part of the audience for books like White's will believe that he
was. They also believe-and how could they believe otherwise-that the
predilections White attributes to Warren, to wit, "fairness, decency, . ..
50. Id. at 471.
51. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. Id. at 495.
53. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975, at 8 (1980).
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individuality, dignity,. . . humanity, and integrity,"" are likely to gener-
ate more desirable results than the often unexpressed, sometimes paro-
chial, and occasionally subliminal predilections of most other Justices.
White's failed effort to transmute Warren's personal ethical code into a
constitutional command also has value, although of a different sort, for
those who repudiate Hughes-believing with Holmes that the paramount
purpose of judicial self-restraint is to keep the Justices' predilections from
outweighing the Constitution itself and that hope of achieving that pur-
pose is not quixotic.
Those Holmesians-I should say "we," because I belong to their com-
pany-must realize that the Justices who preach that faith do not always
practice it. How else are decisions like these to be explained: that a state
legislature cannot make a crime of abortion procured or attempted during
the first trimester of pregnancy for any purpose other than saving the life
of the mother;55 that a state court's decision applying a century-old com-
mon law rule accepting negligent misstatement as grounds for termination
of the privilege to defame a public official violates the command of the
First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom . . . of the press;" 5' 6 or that citizens of the United States have a
privilege not only to travel from one state to another, but also, if they are
needy, to force a state to waive its one-year residence requirement for
welfare benefits ?
5
If we consider ourselves Holmesians and yet approve the above and
similar decisions, it must be because our own predilections have caused us
to accept some extrapolation of the Constitution or metaphoric catchwords
about it as more authoritative than its literal text. Although not likely to
perceive such self-deception in ourselves, as soon as White lets out that
Warren's personal ethical beliefs coincided with "the ethical structure of
the Constitution,"5  we see that Warren's extrapolation was spurious and
his metaphor false. Still, White's failure to establish Warren's theory of
judging as an acceptable alternative to the generally acclaimed but widely
violated judicial orthodoxy of this century may be as valuable as his most
manifest successes in this book. For it may help us guard against the intel-
lectually subversive influence of predilections, however nobly conceived,
upon the Court as well as ourselves.
54. P. 365.
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Blackmun, J.).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The case is New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (Brennan, J.).
57. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Brennan, J.).
58. P. 359.
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The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, edited by David Kairys.
New York. Pantheon Books, 1982. Pp. ix, 321. $22.50.*
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[The Politics of Law is a collection of essays from the Critical Le-
gal Studies movement. The essential tenets of this movement include:
(1) a rejection of the idea that a distinctly legal mode of reasoning
exists; (2) a belief that democratic processes lend a false legitimacy to
existing social and economic relations; (3) the assertion that law and
the state embody values that prevent their neutrality; and (4) the
view that law is an important tool in legitimizing the existing social
system. In this review, Professor Deutsch offers a "critical" analysis
of the ideological role of law in American society as an alternative to
the essays in The Politics of Law.-Ed.]
I.
The United States is a nation forged by revolution. It is also a society
whose economic system is denominated "capitalism." In Marxist termi-
nology, revolution is a political event associated with the termination as
well as the birth of capitalist values, and ideology is doctrine utilized to
produce change.
For political scientists in the United States, the question "Is ideology
dead?" seems more important than the question of the nature of American
ideology. This emphasis is unfortunate because ideological factors are ba-
sic determinants of political action. Indeed, with the exception of personal
friendship or economic and political corruption, it is ideological affinity
that arguably provides the primary basis for political allegiance. Conse-
quently, the inability of American political science to deal with a political
concept of such fundamental importance suggests that ideology must oper-
ate within our society in unique and mysterious ways.
Ideology comprises the set of beliefs by which a society expresses ac-
ceptance of itself. Ideology is what transforms a group, of whatever size or
* For a review more closely tied to The Politics of Law, see Forbath, Book Review, 92 YALE L.J.
(1983).
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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status, into a social entity. For Marxists, ideology consists of revolutionary
action. Yet because revolution may not actually occur at any given time,
ideology can also legitimate the status quo.
Historically, religion served to legitimate the status quo, and it is pre-
sumably to accommodate this fact that Marxist doctrine denominates reli-
gion an opiate. Religion functions as an opiate, however, only when it
erects an impregnable wall between the realms of Caesar and of God. It is
at that point, when neither the secular nor religious world defines aspira-
tions or limits in the other realm, that religion serves simply to maintain a
given state of affairs. But at that point, because it is simply promoting its
version of supernatural reality rather than attempting to interact with the
circumstances of secular existence, religion as opiate is rendered ineffective
as ideology: It becomes ideas incapable of moving people to action. To be
effective, ideology must be in the world and of it, for ideology must move
large numbers of people to change or preserve the social structure that
surrounds them.
Common law is law defined by cases. Since corporate lawyers are paid
largely to keep their clients out of court, corporate law is characterized by
a relative paucity of precedents. Moreover, abstract propositions derivable
from those decisions are not themselves authoritative. Only the holdings
arrived at in the process of applying those propositions to the concrete
complexities of an actual dispute are properly called law.
It is this process of application that constitutes the constant interaction
of law with reality, and thus it is this process that permits law to operate
as ideology. Americans have long accepted the proposition that the words
of the Bill of Rights impose limits on the power exercised by political
authorities. Until the years following World War II, the rights secured by
those words had not been seen as granting individuals social and eco-
nomic, as well as political, entitlements. Only after the Depression forced
the New Deal's acknowledgment of the need for governmental interven-
tion in the economy did constitutional law have to take into account the
reality of social and economic stratification. Nonetheless, the judiciary, the
branch of government most intimately connected with the application of
law to reality, is still entrusted with the ideological task of giving reality to
the Bill of Rights' promise of according individuals the same respect as
the state.
Perhaps law can serve an ideological function only in connection with
political rights; perhaps no ideology can legitimate a society that refuses to
accept social class as limiting what an individual can do. So long as one
believes instead that individual free will can surmount limitations imposed
by class designation, however, one can believe that corporate law, viewed
as a social mechanism, functions in the economic realm as constitutional
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law does in the political-that the ideals of corporate law define, in con-
nection with economic institutions, the image to which our society aspires.
II.
Henry Ford symbolizes many things in the history of the United States.
Developer of the automobile, promoter of an end to international conflict,
family patriarch, opponent of labor unions, he represents an individualism
that manifested itself in a variety of political and economic forms during
the Nineteenth Century. The political manifestation of this individualism
was the Progressive movement of the late Nineteenth Century, which ad-
vocated "direct" democracy at home (symbolized by such reforms as the
initiative, the referendum, and election of judges) and which attempted to
restrict involvement in international affairs to "principled" uses of na-
tional power (like the convening of conferences and the formulation of
agreements in pursuit of ends such as the renunciation by nations of the
right to resort to arms).1
Progressives believed that the accumulation of capital made possible by
the corporate structure permitted persons in control of such entities to
wield inordinately large amounts of economic power, a view that some-
times triumphed over even the desire to allow persons to dispose of the
fruits of their enterprise. It was this perception that led the Michigan
Supreme Court in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 2 to respond to Henry Ford's
plan to expand his production facilities while reducing the selling price of
his cars (and keeping to a minimum the dividends paid to shareholders)
by warning that:
The difference between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of
corporate funds for the benefit of the employees, like the building of
a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies for the bet-
terment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan to benefit
mankind at the expense of others, is obvious. There should be no
confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford
conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and
the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to protesting,
minority stockholders.3
The argument made by the Michigan Supreme Court rests on the
proposition that only competition, as manifested in the profit motive, puts
sufficient pressure on those in control of corporate wealth to prevent abuse
1. For one view of the Progressive movement, see R. HOFSTADER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955).
2. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
3. Id. at 506-07, 170 N.W. at 684.
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of their power.4 Analogous arguments-that certain competitive practices
confer unfair advantages and that the size of certain organizations gives
them an unfair competitive advantage-underlie the antitrust legislation
limiting the exercise of corporate power.
The dilemma faced by a society characterized by this faith in the com-
petitive ideal is how to justify a system that may injure those who fall
short in the contest. The American answer has pointed to success, to a
standard of living that far exceeds that of other societies. These economic
achievements were accompanied by the growth of corporate entities, a fact
that made it difficult to regard size itself as a social evil quite apart from
the theoretical argument that only entities as large as the largest factor in
any given market could compete on even terms with the leader.5
The Dodge v. Ford court, while it forced the payment of dividends
which Ford had attempted to discontinue, refused to enjoin the building of
a Ford-owned steel plant at River Rouge, which was opposed precisely
because it represented too large an agglomeration of economic power.6
What is most striking is the fact that the Michigan Supreme Court re-
fused to act in the face of claims that Ford, over shareholder objections,
was charging less than the market price for his product. "In view of the
fact that the selling price of products may be increased at any time," the
court held, "the ultimate results of the larger business cannot be certainly
estimated. The judges are not business experts."'
The rhetoric of Dodge v. Ford rests on the importance of the profit
motive in disciplining corporate activity. In operational terms, however,
the decision permits invocation of the business judgment rubric to shield
corporate activity from judicial control. In terms of applying the competi-
tive ideal to ongoing economic activity, in other words, only enactment of
the antitrust laws has subjected business entities in the United States to
more severe constraints than those imposed by other nations.' A satisfac-
tory answer to the question of why we continue to accept the costs of such
constraints would encapsulate a great deal of United States history. Such
4. "A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end." Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
5. Indeed, the court rejected the Dodges' contention that a Michigan statute limited the size of an
existing corporation on the basis that the statute's history indicated encouragement of the large corpo-
ration. Id. at 493-96, 170 N.W. at 679-80.
6. The minority stockholders' complaint involved the proper distribution of dividends, but part of
the relief they sought was an injunction against construction of the smelting plant. Id. at 497, 170
N.W. at 681.
7. Id. at 508, 170 N.W. at 684. The results up to the date of the opinion were that the Ford
Motor Company had grown in fourteen years from a company with a capital stock of $150,000 to one
with total assets of over $132 million, while the price of its cars dropped from $900 to $360.
8. In Dodge v. Ford, however, the court specifically stated that Ford's proposed expansion did not
violate the antitrust laws. Id. at 499, 170 N.W. at 681. For a discussion of allowable monopolies, see
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
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an answer-a persuasive description of the power of the competitive
ideal-would canvass those historical factors that make possible an under-
estimation of the significance of limits on individual achievement, those
factors that made the New Frontier an effective political slogan during the
Kennedy years.
Such factors include a wealth of natural resources. They include as well
the United States' freedom from feudalism and thus from the class struc-
tures derived from the networks of personal loyalties that provided stabil-
ity in feudal society. These factors produce the frontier-a social safety
valve and a source of relatively costless economic expansion that allows
the shifts in distribution accompanying changes in production to be per-
ceived as making more available for all. Though the frontier existed
within the territorial United States, nineteenth-century Americans failed
to restrict its significance to the domestic arena. This fact permitted
Progressives to believe that what worked in the United States could work
anywhere-to insist on limiting participation in foreign affairs to "princi-
pled" uses of power-and thus to combine support for competition at
home with a refusal to accept war as an activity made necessary by the
frontier's disappearance.
Viewed from the outside, the frontier produced an innocent certainty
about the rightness of what one was doing that easily turned into arro-
gance when one dealt with those not members of the frontier community.
The antitrust precedent that illustrates this proposition is United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America,9 in which Alcoa was charged with attempting
to acquire a monopoly in the United States. Foreign manufacturers of
aluminum had agreed, through a contract made in Switzerland, to set up
a system of export quotas, and evidence was introduced tending to prove
that this agreement affected potential imports into the United States.10
Though Alcoa's presence in the case was crucial to allow service of pro-
cess, Alcoa had no direct connection with this quota system, participating
only through a Canadian corporation established to hold Alcoa's foreign
properties.
Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Second Circuit,1" held that in
such circumstances proof of effects on commerce alone was an insufficient
basis for liability; proof of intent to control the foreign commerce of the
9. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
10. Id. at 444-45. See Note, Application of the Anti-Trust Laws to Extraterritorial Conspiracies,
49 YALE L. J. 1312, 1314, 1318 (1940) (discussing evidence submitted to district court). The district
court concluded, however, that effects had not been proven. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
11. The Second Circuit in Alcoa was sitting as a court of last appeal pursuant to a certificate from
the Supreme Court. 148 F.2d at 421.
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United States was also required.1" Although there was no evidence on this
question,1" the Second Circuit found the requisite intent by relying upon
the rule that antitrust defendants are presumed to intend the natural con-
sequences of their acts."" Since the evidence in Alcoa seemed to reveal
effects on United States imports, 5 application of the rule provided a pre-
sumption of intent. In cases decided after Alcoa, however, pleas of good
intent or lack of intent, apparently even when proved, 6 have failed to
prevent the imposition of liability.' 7 Alcoa is troubling, in other words,
not only because it imposes United States policy upon foreign entities, but
also because it is not above-board about why it is doing so.
III.
F.D.R.'s political success in mitigating the social impact of the Great
Depression is undeniable. He successfully deployed a series of experimen-
tal and often contradictory policies so that the public responded with hope
rather than exasperation. Only as F.D.R.'s second term drew to an end
did it become clear that his economic measures had not produced a sus-
tained recovery. True recovery occurred with World War II, but by then
the Great Depression had unraveled the simple correlation between cor-
porate size and economic success that characterized the period of economic
growth following the Civil War.
12. Id. at 443-44. This view seems to have been accepted by commentators. See, e.g., DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 76
(1955); Barron, Foreign Trade-Mark Licensing and American Anti-Trust Laws: Some Observations
on the Timken Case, 9 CATm. U.L. REV. 25 (1960).
13. See Note, supra note 10, at 1318.
14. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 243 (1899).
15. The appellate court stated:
The [district] judge also found that the 1936 agreement did not "materially affect the . . .
foreign trade or commerce of the United States"; apparently because the imported ingot was
greater in 1936 and 1937 than in earlier years. We cannot accept this finding. . . . It by no
means follows from such an increase that the agreement did not restrict imports; and inciden-
tally it so happens that in those years such inference as is possible at all, leads to the opposite
conclusion. . . . [Tihe proportion of imports to domestic ingot was about 15.6 per cent for the
first period and about 12.6 per cent for the second. We do not mean to infer from this that the
quota system of 1936 did in fact restrain imports, as these figures might suggest; but we do
mean that nothing is to be inferred from the gross increase of imports.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d. at 444.
16. See United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (al-
though National Lead was unaware of antitrust consequences of its action, it was found liable to-
gether with DuPont, which had sought extensive legal advice on antitrust consequences of its actions),
aff'd, 322 U.S. 319 (1947).
17. E.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. Mass. 1950)
(defense of lack of motive not considered); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp.
284, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (good intent no defense), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 890-91 (D.N.J. 1949) (although Phillips proved to have knowl-
edge of antitrust laws, question of intent was not considered). Nor was good intent a defense in pre-
Alcoa cases involving conduct within the United States. See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 86
(1917); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912).
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The Depression shifted perceptions of economic power, a shift symbol-
ized by a photograph taken in the United States Senate Caucus Room on
June 1, 1933. Newspapers ran the picture of an avuncular sixty-two-
year-old in a leather-upholstered armchair with a female midget on his
lap. The man in the photograph was J.P. Morgan, the banker who or-
ganized the holding companies that dominated various sectors of the
American economy. Morgan was waiting to testify before a Senate com-
mittee about to condemn the practices of his bank, and the midget (who
had been placed on his lap by a press agent) was a member of the
Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus troupe.1 8
Seven years later, Litwin v. Allen,19 a shareholders' derivative suit
against various banks and members of J. P. Morgan & Co., held that a
transaction involving the sale by Allegheny Corporation of certain railroad
bonds violated fiduciary principles because it was combined with an op-
tion to repurchase. The Van Sweringens, who controlled Allegheny, were
one of the group of entrepreneurs identified with the Great Depression,
and Allegheny had been organized as a holding company to provide them
with funds for investment in railroad securities. The option in question,
whose terms were extremely favorable to the Van Sweringens,2" resulted
from borrowing limitations in Allegheny's charter.2 1 Moreover, because
the bonds were convertible, the Van Sweringens insisted on the right of
repurchase to avoid the possibility of losing control of the railroad. 2
As the court noted, "There [was] no case directly in point."'23 The fact
that this absence of precedent did not prevent the court from invalidating
the transaction underlines the shift in attitude that separates Dodge v.
Ford from Litwin v. Allen: Law made by courts had become a process
that functioned not simply to impose limits on the growth of corporations,
but also to supervise their business activities. The procedural device which
implements this function is the shareholders' derivative suit, and cases on
the frontier of corporate law today are delineating the standards of re-
viewing a corporation's decision not to pursue such a suit.
In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,2 4 the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware-recognized as "eminent" as the result of its "unique experience in
18. G. THOMAS & M. MORGAN-WFIrS, THE DAY THE BUBBLE BURST: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
THE WALL STREET CRASH OF 1929, at 417-18 (1979).
19. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
20. The option was for a repurchase at the original sale price. The Van Sweringens therefore
bore none of the risk of a drop in the price of the bonds. Id. at 698. It was this uneven distribution of
risk which led the court to hold the defendants liable. Id. at 697-99.
21. Id. at 691-92.
22. Id. at 692.
23. Id. at 696.
24. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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the area" of derivative suits'5-required the trial court to override a cor-
porate decision to discontinue a derivative suit whenever "the Court deter-
mines . . . that the [corporation has not demonstrated that the decision-
making body] is. . . independent [and] has . . . shown reasonable bases
for its conclusions, or, if the Court is not satisfied for other reasons relat-
ing to the process, including but not limited to the good faith of the [deci-
sionmaking body]."' 21 Moreover, even if a corporation meets this test, the
trial court may, "in its discretion," apply "its own independent business
judgment. . . [and] when appropriate, give special consideration to mat-
ters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best inter-
ests." 7 The Zapata court justified this extraordinary degree of judical
review earlier in the opinion:
[N]otwithstanding our conviction that Delaware law entrusts the
corporate power to a properly authorized committee, we must be
mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow directors in
the same corporation and fellow directors, in this instance, who des-
ignated them to serve both as directors and [independent litigation]
committee members [charged with deciding whether or not to con-
tinue the derivative litigation]. The question naturally arises whether
a "there but for the grace of God go I" empathy might not play a
role. And the further question arises whether inquiry as to indepen-
dence, good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard
against abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse. 8
The problem posed by Zapata centers on the nature of the judicial task
this test requires. The difficulties involved in the probing of "perhaps sub-
conscious" motives are apparent in Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas &
Electric Co.,' 9 in which Judge Cardozo upheld a trial court decision void-
ing a contract between two corporations that shared a common director. It
is unclear whether the Globe opinion was based upon the substantive
terms of the contract, the fact that negotiations on behalf of one of the
corporations had been conducted by a subordinate, or the fact that the
director who had conducted the negotiations on behalf of the other corpo-
ration held the same position in each of the parties to the contract. What
is striking is the presentation of the facts on the basis of which Cardozo
held the contract void: "At least, a finding that there was [a relation of
trust reposed, of influence exerted, of superior knowledge on the one side
25. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 891 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Citytrust v. Joy, 103 S.
Ct. 1498 (1983).
26. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 787.
29. 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
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and legitimate dependence on the other] has evidence to sustain it";3 °
"[tihese elements of unfairness [the common director] must have known, if
indeed his knowledge be material";"1 "[t]he inference that [the common
director foresaw the precise evils that developed] might not be unsup-
ported by the evidence.""8
In short, the facts are rarely clear, and because it is so difficult to deter-
mine whether or not a potential conflict of interest has in fact had an
impact on a given transaction, decisions like Globe produced statutes de-
fining in precise terms when a conflict of interest will void contracts or
transactions. Such laws have transformed judges making law about con-
flict of interest into interpreters of statutes. This shift of the judicial role is
illustrated by Joy v. North33 in which the Second Circuit held that the
test enunciated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata was law in the
State of Connecticut.
Agreeing that Connecticut cases do not resolve the question whether
Connecticut's law is the same as Delaware's, the majority and dissent ar-
rived at conflicting positions by treating as relevant different statutory ma-
terial. The majority focused on the fact that Connecticut's indemnification
statute "adopts the middle ground between no indemnification and per-
missible indemnification without regard to outcome and thus does not be-
speak a negative attitude toward enforcement of fiduciary obligations
through meritorious derivative litigation.""U While the majority left un-
clear how the content of the common law governing conflict of interests is
defined by statutory provisions regarding rights to indemnification, the
dissent fared no better in demonstrating the relevance of its statute. It
relied on the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Burks v.
Lasker, which held (in a footnote) that "[w]hile lack of impartiality [of
disinterested directors] may or may not be true as a matter of fact in indi-
vidual cases, it is not a conclusion of law required by the Investment
Company Act."'3 5 But the statutory provisions interpreted in Burks v.
Lasker, while they do deal directly with conflicts of interest, not only are
restricted to investment companies but are also a matter of federal rather
than state law.
The Joy v. North opinions must cite either judicial precedent or statu-
tory authority for the result they reach because of the business judgment
rule, which requires judges to rely on something more than the certainty
30. Id. at 490, 121 N.E. at 380.
31. Id. at 491, 121 N.E. at 380.
32. Id. at 492, 121 N.E. at 381.
33. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub norn Citytrust v. Joy, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
34. Id. at 889.
35. 441 U.S. 471, 485 n.15 (1979). The dissent in Joy v. North cites Burks in 692 F.2d at 900
(Cardamone, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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of hindsight when overturning a business decision as unreasonable. The
business decision examined in Joy v. North is whether it was reasonable
for a bank continually to extend further credit to a builder (presumably in
hopes of recapturing some of the moneys already advanced). What the
majority eventually rested on was the fact that the builder's
venture. . is so similar to the classic case of Litwin v. Allen, supra
(bank purchase of bonds with an option in the seller to repurchase at
the original price, the bank thus bearing the entire risk of a drop in
price with no hope of gain beyond the stipulated interest) that we
cannot agree with the [Special Litigation Committee of independent
directors which recommended dismissal of the suit on the basis of
the] conclusion that only a "possibility of a finding of negligence"
exists.36
To ask whether Joy v. North was correctly decided is to assess the prec-
edential significance of Litwin and to attempt to determine whether the
Litwin opinion compelled the decision arrived at by the majority in Joy v.
North. These tasks require us to ask why the Litwin court reached the
result it did. The Litwin opinion recognizes precisely why it was so diffi-
cult for a judge to arrive at a just result in that case:
[T]he main transactions attacked in this case, those dealing with the
purchase of the Missouri Pacific bonds with the option of repurchase
to Allegheny Corporation . . . took place in October, 1930. There
had been a crash in the stock market in October, 1929. In April,
1930, there was an upswing in the market. Shortly thereafter there
began a slow but steady decline until October, 1930, when there was
another severe break. The real significance of what was taking place
was, generally speaking, missed at the time, but is plain in the retro-
spect. Forces were at work which for the most part were unforsee-
able. Men who were judging conditions in October, 1930, by what
had been the course and the experience of past panics thought that
the bottom had been reached and that the worst of the depression
was over; that any change would be for the better and that recovery
might reasonably be envisaged for the near future. Experience
turned out to be fallacious and judgment proved to be erroneous; but
that did not become apparent until some time in 1931. In order to
judge the transactions complained of, therefore, we must not only
hold an inquest on the past but, what is much more difficult, we
must attempt to take ourselves back to the time when the events here
questioned occurred and try to put ourselves in the position of those
who engaged in them.87
36. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 896.
37. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 677 (1940).
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Given that retrospective awareness, what seems to me crucial is that the
Van Sweringens were valued Morgan customers. Why then was the stip-
ulated interest for the loan/option considered an insufficient basis on
which to justify J.P. Morgan's giving of the option? My answer rests on
the Litwin court's recognition that "the only [one of the four] transac-
tion[s] [involved in the case] in which it is claimed that a profit was made
by directors sought to be held liable is that involving [a private purchase
at prices below the market] of Allegheny Corporation common stock from
J. P. Morgan & Co. in January, 1929."" Of this transaction, the court
said "[t]he interest of the individuals who bought privately was specula-
tive," 9 which it interpreted to mean that "[t]here is nothing substantial to
the contention that the Allegheny stock transaction operated on the minds
of the directors as a 'favor'. 40 What Litwin held in evaluating the private
offer of Allegheny common stock, in other words, is that the fact that a
market risk was being taken by those to whom J. P. Morgan sold stock
outweighed the fact that the price he charged was below the market; that
even a favorable speculative opportunity did not compromise a director's
fiduciary duty of acting with undivided loyalty on behalf of the corpora-
tion on whose board he sits.
One of J. P. Morgan & Co.'s business practices, branded an abuse of
power by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, was the use of
"preferred lists" of persons who received holding company stock prior to
the time trading was begun."1 The Litwin judgment is thus less categorical
than that arrived at by the Senate Committee, in that it condemns only
the single option transaction in connection with the Allegheny bonds
rather than an established "preferred list" practice. Whether this distinc-
tion is sufficient to make application of the Litwin holding a justifiable
basis for the decision in joy v. North is a question that probes the validity
of our societal insistence that legislative rules can validly apply to individ-
uals only with the approval of the judiciary. The essence of this belief is
that the opportunities for abuse of power afforded a judge in the process
of making law are qualitatively different, not only from the opportunities
for abuse of power made possible by the legislative process, but also from
those afforded the corporate decisionmaker by the process of meeting real
and imagined competitive threats. The question raised, in other words, is
the legitimacy of that portion of the Zapata test that permits a court to
apply "its own independent business judgment."
38. Id. at 676.
39. Id. at 690.
40. Id. at 691.
41. F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 27 (1939).
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IV.
I shall examine the legitimacy of Zapata by focusing on a concrete ex-
ample. To avoid the ambiguities of the distinction between the promulga-
tion of legal standards andthe finding of determinative facts (a distinction
that defines both the responsibility and the limitation placed on the work
of an appellate judge), I choose the decision in Dodge v. Ford. The ques-
tion I pose is whether the actions of Henry Ford were sufficiently "disin-
terested" to avoid the possibility that they represented the perhaps subcon-
scious abuse of power mentioned in Zapata.
If we look simply at what the Michigan Supreme Court did in Dodge
v. Ford, we must conclude that it judged the building of River Rouge as
sufficiently disinterested, but reached the opposite conclusion about the
withholding of dividends. In terms of our question-whether what Ford is
doing is an abuse of power-the Court's distinction is at best a purely
formal one. The question thus becomes one of the legitimacy of the power
of the appellate judge-why the jurist should have the relatively uncon-
trolled power to determine whether a given business decision was justifia-
ble. What makes the problem of the responsibility of the appellate judge
so intractable, moreover, is that the decision of the court does not make
the law; the law is precedent, and precedent is the way the decision ar-
rived at by the trial or appellate tribunal is treated in later opinions.
Thus, for instance, Alcoa becomes a troubling decision only when later
cases make clear that intent has nothing to do with courts assuming juris-
diction over foreign transactions.'2
The problem in Dodge v. Ford was created by the fact that Henry
Ford's declarations of his intention to put all the company's future earn-
ings back into the business was published throughout the United States in
"substantially the following language":
"My ambition," declared Mr. Ford, "is to employ still more men; to
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible
number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do
this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into the
business."' 43
The problem was that instead of defining his goals in terms of the process
of profit maximization, Henry Ford insisted on extolling the benefits of
increased economic activity. It was his statement of the ideals motivating
42. See supra note 17.
43. 204 Mich. at 468, 170 N.W. at 671.
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his behavior that permitted the court to question the extent to which that
behavior was sufficently "disinterested.1
44
Focusing on the particular controversy being adjudicated, however, is
not enough. So long as judicial rules are being developed, so long as the
process of their application continues to interact with the social reality
that law attempts to govern, the court's description of the reality contained
in the precedents cited to justify its decision must be sufficiently compel-
ling to serve as a standard for judging future behavior. If it is to remain
effective, moreover, the doctrine being promulgated can never become so
clearly defined as to be impervious to further change. Thus, the clearer d
rule is, the more subject it is to manipulation justified by compliance with
its explicit formulation. In systemic terms, in other words, any sufficiently
uniform standard of behavior will at some point be exploited through de-
velopment of an application not derivable from the regularities by which
the standard was defined.
The rules that govern acceptance of such innovation (the law that gov-
erns the marketplace) both determine individual success and define the
behavior of the group of which the individual is a member. This duality
permits law to serve simultaneously as a constraint which the skillful can
successfully manipulate to their individual advantage and as a norm
whose existence everyone must respect. It is also as a result of this duality
that the law fulfills an ideological function, i.e., it is acceptance of the
competitive ideal of corporate law that transforms individual capitalists
into elements of a functioning social structure.
V.
Whether the ideology of corporate law is functioning to justify revolu-
tion or to legitimate the status quo, however, is an unanswerable question.
Revolution, signifying the loss of legitimacy, occurs whenever enough in-
dividuals are sufficiently dissatisfied that their desire to replace the choices
embodied in the present system outweighs their concern over the poten-
tially unsatisfactory consequences of new choices.
For individuals, revolutions involve shifts in the criteria by which they
identify themselves as political actors; a successful revolution prompts a
sufficient number of individual shifts to produce a change in the political
values held by the society. Individual social and political identifications
are ordinarily matters governed by habit, by the experience of the past.
Revolution can thus be defined (in terms of the individual) as the replace-
44. Indeed, the Dodge v. Ford court described Mr. Ford as intending "to continue the corporation
henceforth as a semi-eleemosynary institution and not as a business institution." Id. at 504, 170 N.W.
at 683. Mr. Ford's views are discussed at greater length in id. at 505-506, 170 N.W. at 683-84.
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ment of habitual by spontaneous political behavior. Such behavior is ordi-
narily perceived as a free and disinterested act, although it can, of course,
be characterized as the individual's rationalization of the need to accept
new social categories. If the revolution succeeds, however, and a shift in
social values occurs, new terms that define individuals as political beings
come into existence, and the shifts in individual identifications are ratio-
nalizations only if there is no such thing as a free act.
In Marxist terms, revolution is defined as the social response to the
alienation caused by the division of labor. The division of labor, however,
results in the provision of more material goods. To the extent that such
goods are perceived as valuable, individual alienation may be a social ne-
cessity, an obligation that must be assumed by those who wish to be per-
ceived as behaving in a "disinterested" manner.
The alienation felt by individuals working within a corporation places
upon that organization the burden of making activities undertaken for its
benefit appear meaningful, even when this means structuring work in
ways that are not economically efficient. The last stage of capitalism, in
other words, may be a shift from competitive economic entities to a self-
sustaining bureaucracy. Whether that stage will in fact occur or, if
achieved, will eventually result in revolution depends upon whether the
ideal of competition-the ideal that makes corporate law an effective ide-
ology-continues to be attractive, and whether the organization of Ameri-
can society permits rewarding behavior motivated by that ideal.
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